政府设强制保险，用风险定价激励AI开发者防范不可保风险。
Insuring Uninsurable Risks from AI: Government as Insurer of Last Resort
- 政府强制开发商缴纳风险保费，以激励最优防范行为。
- 通过专家评估与贝叶斯真相机制确保风险估算真实可靠。
- 保费用于匹配资助安全研究，提升公共品供给效率。
许多专家认为，人工智能系统迟早会引发无法投保的风险，包括存在性风险。这导致极端的‘责任豁免’问题：一旦灾难发生，几乎无人能被追责。本文提出一种新方案：由政府提供强制性赔偿计划，向AI开发者征收风险定价的赔偿费，以促使社会最优水平的预防投入。风险估计通过调查专家（包括受保开发者）获得，并采用贝叶斯真相机制激励诚实且努力的反馈。相比其他方案，该方法更充分挖掘私人信息，并为受保方提供明确信号——需降低哪些风险才能减少保费。建议将收取的费用用于资助开发者所需的安全研究，采用二次融资（Quadratic Financing）机制，使安全研究项目竞争私有捐赠，从而决定公共资金的补充额度。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Many experts believe that AI systems will sooner or later pose uninsurable risks, including existential risks. This creates an extreme judgment-proof problem: few if any parties can be held accountable ex post in the event of such a catastrophe. This paper proposes a novel solution: a government-provided, mandatory indemnification program for AI developers. The program uses risk-priced indemnity fees to induce socially optimal levels of care. Risk-estimates are determined by surveying experts, including indemnified developers. The Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism is employed to incent honest and effortful responses. Compared to alternatives, this approach arguably better leverages all private information, and provides a clearer signal to indemnified developers regarding what risks they must mitigate to lower their fees. It's recommended that collected fees be used to help fund the safety research developers need, employing a fund matching mechanism (Quadratic Financing) to induce an optimal supply of this public good. Under Quadratic Financing, safety research projects would compete for private contributions from developers, signaling how much each is to be supplemented with public funds.
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