arXiv:2409.14513cs.LGcs.CR2024-09EMNLP被引 6

用少量计算量实现高效大模型成员推理攻击

Order of Magnitude Speedups for LLM Membership Inference

  • 采用小规模分位数回归模型集成,大幅降低攻击计算成本
  • 仅需94%的计算资源,攻击准确率仍媲美甚至超越主流方法
  • 对不同模型架构和分词器具备鲁棒性,无需目标模型信息

大型语言模型(LLMs)虽有望革新计算领域,但其复杂结构与海量训练数据也带来显著隐私风险。其中最简单的威胁之一是成员推理攻击(MIAs),即攻击者试图判断特定数据是否曾被用于模型训练。尽管该风险已知,现有先进方法依赖训练多个计算开销巨大的影子模型,导致大规模模型的风险评估难以实施。本文借鉴近期基于分位数回归的攻击思路,提出一种低成本的成员推理攻击方法:通过构建一组小型分位数回归模型的集成,判断文档是否属于训练集。我们在多种微调后的LLM(OPT、Pythia、Llama)及多个数据集上验证了该方法的有效性。在所有场景中,本方法的攻击准确率与主流影子模型方法相当或更优,且仅需其6%的计算预算。此外,该方法在多轮训练的目标模型上表现更佳,并展现出架构错配鲁棒性——即无需了解目标模型的具体分词器与架构,即可成功发动攻击。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Large Language Models (LLMs) have the promise to revolutionize computing broadly, but their complexity and extensive training data also expose significant privacy vulnerabilities. One of the simplest privacy risks associated with LLMs is their susceptibility to membership inference attacks (MIAs), wherein an adversary aims to determine whether a specific data point was part of the model's training set. Although this is a known risk, state of the art methodologies for MIAs rely on training multiple computationally costly shadow models, making risk evaluation prohibitive for large models. Here we adapt a recent line of work which uses quantile regression to mount membership inference attacks; we extend this work by proposing a low-cost MIA that leverages an ensemble of small quantile regression models to determine if a document belongs to the model's training set or not. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach on fine-tuned LLMs of varying families (OPT, Pythia, Llama) and across multiple datasets. Across all scenarios we obtain comparable or improved accuracy compared to state of the art shadow model approaches, with as little as 6% of their computation budget. We demonstrate increased effectiveness across multi-epoch trained target models, and architecture miss-specification robustness, that is, we can mount an effective attack against a model using a different tokenizer and architecture, without requiring knowledge on the target model.

成员推理大模型安全量化回归隐私攻击

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