提出一种兼顾公平与效率的预算分配方法，避免过度支出。
Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending
- 在保持公平性前提下，放宽严格比例分配约束以提升效率
- 实测在多个真实场景中表现优异，整体性能优于传统方法
- 适合关注公平与实际可行性的公共预算决策场景
在参与式预算（Participatory Budgeting, PB）中，选民通过投票决定在给定预算内资助哪些项目。在PB背景下，比例性至关重要，以确保所有选民群体得到平等对待。然而，纯粹的比例规则有时会导致次优结果。本文提出一种名为‘等额分担的有界超支方法’（BOS Equal Shares）的稳健变体，该方法在保持比例性的同时提升效率。它缓解了严格比例公理带来的低效问题，仍能提供与原始等额分担法相似的公平保障。我们在多个真实世界的PB实例上进行了广泛实证分析，结果表明BOS Equal Shares在多项指标上表现卓越。此外，我们还提出并研究了一种允许项目部分资助的分数形式的等额分担方法。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
In participatory budgeting (PB), voters decide through voting which subset of projects to fund within a given budget. Proportionality in the context of PB is crucial to ensure equal treatment of all groups of voters. However, pure proportional rules can sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes. We introduce the Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending (BOS Equal Shares), a robust variant of Equal Shares that balances proportionality and efficiency. BOS Equal Shares addresses inefficiencies implied by strict proportionality axioms, yet the rule still provides fairness guarantees, similar to the original Method of Equal Shares. Our extensive empirical analysis on real-world PB instances shows excellent performance of BOS Equal Shares across several metrics. In the course of the analysis, we also present and examine a fractional variant of the Method of Equal Shares which allows for partial funding of projects.
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