用电磁干扰伪造激光雷达数据，可导致误判或失效。
PhantomLiDAR: Cross-modality Signal Injection Attacks against LiDAR
- 通过电磁干扰攻击激光雷达内部模块，实现跨模态信号注入。
- 可在5款市售激光雷达上实现点云干扰、注入、删除甚至断电。
- 适用于自动驾驶安全研究，提醒传感器防御设计需考虑电磁风险。
激光雷达（LiDAR）是自动驾驶中关键的传感器，提供精确的三维空间信息。以往针对激光雷达的信号攻击主要依赖激光干扰。本文首次探究跨模态信号注入攻击——即通过有意的电磁干扰（IEMI）操纵激光雷达输出。我们的洞察是，尽管激光雷达内部模块（如激光接收电路、监测传感器、光束转向模块）经过严格的电磁兼容性（EMC）测试，仍可能耦合外部IEMI信号，导致系统故障。基于此，我们提出了PhantomLiDAR攻击，可实现点云干扰、点云注入、点云删除，甚至使激光雷达断电。我们在五款市售激光雷达上通过仿真与真实实验验证了该攻击的有效性，并在动态行驶场景中进行了可行性测试。同时，我们提出可在传感器层和车辆系统层实施的潜在防御措施，以降低电磁干扰带来的风险。视频演示见：https://sites.google.com/view/phantomlidar。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is a pivotal sensor for autonomous driving, offering precise 3D spatial information. Previous signal attacks against LiDAR systems mainly exploit laser signals. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of cross-modality signal injection attacks, i.e., injecting intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) to manipulate LiDAR output. Our insight is that the internal modules of a LiDAR, i.e., the laser receiving circuit, the monitoring sensors, and the beam-steering modules, even with strict electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing, can still couple with the IEMI attack signals and result in the malfunction of LiDAR systems. Based on the above attack surfaces, we propose the PhantomLiDAR attack, which manipulates LiDAR output in terms of Points Interference, Points Injection, Points Removal, and even LiDAR Power-Off. We evaluate and demonstrate the effectiveness of PhantomLiDAR with both simulated and real-world experiments on five COTS LiDAR systems. We also conduct feasibility experiments in real-world moving scenarios. We provide potential defense measures that can be implemented at both the sensor level and the vehicle system level to mitigate the risks associated with IEMI attacks. Video demonstrations can be viewed at https://sites.google.com/view/phantomlidar.
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