研究大模型训练数据中敏感信息泄露,发现攻击者能用少次查询提取更多隐私数据。
PII-Scope: A Comprehensive Study on Training Data PII Extraction Attacks in LLMs
- 设计多场景测试基准,评估大模型中敏感信息提取攻击效果。
- 单次查询低估泄露风险,复杂攻击可使泄露率提升五倍。
- 微调模型比预训练模型更易泄露敏感信息,适合安全研究人员参考。
本文提出PII-Scope,一个全面的基准,用于评估针对大语言模型(LLMs)的个人身份信息(PII)提取攻击在不同威胁场景下的表现。研究揭示了若干关键超参数(如示例选择)对攻击效果的影响。基于此理解,我们拓展到更真实的攻击场景,探索采用重复多样查询和迭代学习等高级对抗策略的PII攻击。大量实验表明,现有单次查询攻击显著低估了PII泄漏风险;实际上,在有限查询预算下,利用复杂对抗能力,针对预训练模型的PII提取率可提升至五倍。此外,我们评估了微调模型中的PII泄漏,发现其比预训练模型更易泄露。本工作建立了真实威胁场景下PII提取攻击的严谨实证基准,为制定有效缓解策略提供了坚实基础。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
In this work, we introduce PII-Scope, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate state-of-the-art methodologies for PII extraction attacks targeting LLMs across diverse threat settings. Our study provides a deeper understanding of these attacks by uncovering several hyperparameters (e.g., demonstration selection) crucial to their effectiveness. Building on this understanding, we extend our study to more realistic attack scenarios, exploring PII attacks that employ advanced adversarial strategies, including repeated and diverse querying, and leveraging iterative learning for continual PII extraction. Through extensive experimentation, our results reveal a notable underestimation of PII leakage in existing single-query attacks. In fact, we show that with sophisticated adversarial capabilities and a limited query budget, PII extraction rates can increase by up to fivefold when targeting the pretrained model. Moreover, we evaluate PII leakage on finetuned models, showing that they are more vulnerable to leakage than pretrained models. Overall, our work establishes a rigorous empirical benchmark for PII extraction attacks in realistic threat scenarios and provides a strong foundation for developing effective mitigation strategies.
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