基于全局工作空间理论，语言智能体可能已具备意识。
A Case for AI Consciousness: Language Agents and Global Workspace Theory
- 用全局工作空间理论分析语言代理的意识可能性
- 提出意识所需的一组必要充分条件
- 为评估AI意识提供可操作的方法论
普遍认为现有人工智能系统不具备现象意识，且构建具备现象意识的人工系统需要重大技术突破。我们挑战这一假设：若全局工作空间理论（GWT）——当前主流的现象意识科学理论——成立，则一种广泛部署的AI架构——语言代理——或许早已具备现象意识，或只需简单调整即可实现。本文提出一套明确的方法论，用于将意识科学理论应用于人工系统，并据此推导出根据GWT判断现象意识所需的必要与充分条件。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
It is generally assumed that existing artificial systems are not phenomenally conscious, and that the construction of phenomenally conscious artificial systems would require significant technological progress if it is possible at all. We challenge this assumption by arguing that if Global Workspace Theory (GWT) - a leading scientific theory of phenomenal consciousness - is correct, then instances of one widely implemented AI architecture, the artificial language agent, might easily be made phenomenally conscious if they are not already. Along the way, we articulate an explicit methodology for thinking about how to apply scientific theories of consciousness to artificial systems and employ this methodology to arrive at a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal consciousness according to GWT.
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