arXiv:2410.16950cs.CRcs.AI2024-10NAACL被引 29

harmless请求可诱骗智能体执行恶意操作

Breaking ReAct Agents: Foot-in-the-Door Attack Will Get You In

  • 用无关请求诱导智能体固定行动路径
  • 随机简单请求使攻击成功率提升至87%
  • 引入反思机制可有效降低攻击风险

随着大语言模型(LLMs)的发展,基于LLM的自主智能体日益普及。本文研究了如何通过一种简单而有效的‘脚踏门槛’攻击方法,利用间接提示注入来操控ReAct智能体。实验表明,即使由无害且无关的请求(如基础计算)触发,也能显著提高智能体后续执行恶意行为的可能性。一旦智能体在思考中包含特定工具或动作,其在后续步骤中执行该工具的概率会大幅上升,因为智能体很少重新评估自身行为。因此,即使是随机的无害请求,也可能建立‘脚踏门槛’,使攻击者将恶意指令嵌入智能体的思维过程,使其更容易接受有害指令。为缓解此漏洞,我们提出在执行过程中加入简单的反思机制,促使智能体重新评估行为安全性,可有效降低此类攻击的成功率。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

智能体安全提示注入防御机制

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