提出新规则提升预算分配的福利与公平性，填补现有研究空白。
Exploring Welfare Maximization and Fairness in Participatory Budgeting
- 设计兼顾福利与公平的新预算分配规则
- 覆盖固定成本与可变成本两种项目场景
- 适合关注公平决策与资源分配的研究者
参与式预算（Participatory Budgeting, PB）是一种通过聚合个体对各类项目的偏好来分配可分割资源（通常为预算）的投票机制，广泛应用于政府公共项目资金分配及科研资助决策。本博士论文研究不同PB模型下的福利最大化与公平性目标。贡献在于提出了新型PB规则以实现更高福利与更强公平性，并引入了一系列新的效用概念、公理性质与公平性定义，有效弥补了现有文献在各类模型中的空白。论文分为两大部分：第一部分针对二元偏好，第二部分针对序数偏好。每部分均考虑两种情形：(i) 每个项目的成本为单一固定值且不允许部分资助；(ii) 项目成本灵活，可取多个值。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a voting paradigm for distributing a divisible resource, usually called a budget, among a set of projects by aggregating the preferences of individuals over these projects. It is implemented quite extensively for purposes such as government allocating funds to public projects and funding agencies selecting research proposals to support. This PhD dissertation studies the welfare-related and fairness-related objectives for different PB models. Our contribution lies in proposing and exploring novel PB rules that maximize welfare and promote fairness, as well as, in introducing and investigating a range of novel utility notions, axiomatic properties, and fairness notions, effectively filling the gaps in the existing literature for each PB model. The thesis is divided into two main parts, the first focusing on dichotomous and the second focusing on ordinal preferences. Each part considers two cases: (i) the cost of each project is restricted to a single value and partial funding is not permitted and (ii) the cost of each project is flexible and may assume multiple values.
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