arXiv:2411.00349cs.CRcs.AI2024-11综述被引 4

系统梳理比特币工作量证明机制中的攻击手段及其组合效应。

Examining Attacks on Consensus and Incentive Systems in Proof-of-Work Blockchains: A Systematic Literature Review

  • 分析孤立攻击与多策略组合的攻击路径。
  • 揭示自私挖矿与区块隐瞒等攻击对收益的影响。
  • 适合区块链安全研究者与协议设计者参考。

比特币凭借其透明性、安全性与可访问性,成为主流加密货币,其安全依赖于区块链技术——一种由共识机制和激励机制组成的去中心化账本。其中,工作量证明(PoW)要求矿工解决复杂的密码学难题以添加新区块,而激励机制则通过新发行的比特币奖励矿工。然而,随着比特币普及度提升,针对这些机制的攻击日益增多,包括自私挖矿、双重支付和区块隐瞒等,严重威胁系统安全、效率与奖励分配。近期研究表明,这些攻击可与其他恶意策略(如网络层攻击)或非恶意策略(如诚实挖矿)结合,形成更复杂的攻击模式,显著提高成功率与利润。本文首先分析孤立攻击及其盈利性,随后探讨攻击间及攻击与其它策略的协同效应,进一步研究多个竞争矿池相互实施自私挖矿与区块隐瞒时的经济回报变化。最后提出设计指南,明确未来研究应聚焦的防御方向。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Cryptocurrencies have gained popularity due to their transparency, security, and accessibility compared to traditional financial systems, with Bitcoin, introduced in 2009, leading the market. Bitcoin's security relies on blockchain technology - a decentralized ledger consisting of a consensus and an incentive mechanism. The consensus mechanism, Proof of Work (PoW), requires miners to solve difficult cryptographic puzzles to add new blocks, while the incentive mechanism rewards them with newly minted bitcoins. However, as Bitcoin's acceptance grows, it faces increasing threats from attacks targeting these mechanisms, such as selfish mining, double-spending, and block withholding. These attacks compromise security, efficiency, and reward distribution. Recent research shows that these attacks can be combined with each other or with either malicious strategies, such as network-layer attacks, or non-malicious strategies, like honest mining. These combinations lead to more sophisticated attacks, increasing the attacker's success rates and profitability. Therefore, understanding and evaluating these attacks is essential for developing effective countermeasures and ensuring long-term security. This paper begins by examining individual attacks executed in isolation and their profitability. It then explores how combining these attacks with each other or with other malicious and non-malicious strategies can enhance their overall effectiveness and profitability. The analysis further explores how the deployment of attacks such as selfish mining and block withholding by multiple competing mining pools against each other impacts their economic returns. Lastly, a set of design guidelines is provided, outlining areas future work should focus on to prevent or mitigate the identified threats.

区块链安全挖矿攻击共识机制激励模型

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