arXiv:2411.07362cs.MAcs.GT2024-11被引 10

将主动推理与博弈论结合,让智能体在动态环境中自主推测他人意图并制定策略。

Factorised Active Inference for Strategic Multi-Agent Interactions

  • 每个智能体独立建模其他智能体的内部状态,用于联合战略规划。
  • 在多玩家非平稳博弈中,群体期望自由能未在均衡点最小化。
  • 适用于研究复杂社会互动中的集体智能与适应性行为。

理解个体智能体在集体中如何做出战略决策,对经济学、神经科学和多智能体系统等领域至关重要。主动推理框架(AIF)描述了智能体如何利用生成模型来调整其对环境的认知与行为;博弈论则形式化了具有潜在竞争目标的智能体之间的战略互动。为弥合二者差距,我们提出对生成模型进行因子分解:每个智能体维护对其他智能体内部状态的显式个体信念,并据此在联合情境中进行战略规划。我们将该模型应用于两至三玩家的迭代广义博弈,研究游戏转换带来的群体效应——即智能体偏好(博弈收益)随时间变化。这种非平稳性,超出互惠适应所导致的变化,更贴近真实社会环境,要求智能体适应不断变化的社会背景。最后,我们基于数值模拟数据对关键AIF量进行了动力学分析:变分自由能(VFE)和期望自由能(EFE)。群体层面的EFE可用于刻画多个纳什均衡下的吸引盆,在不同条件下发现其并不必然在整体上最小化。通过整合AIF与博弈论,我们得以深入理解智能集体如何在动态环境中涌现、学习并优化行动,无论合作或非合作情境。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Understanding how individual agents make strategic decisions within collectives is important for advancing fields as diverse as economics, neuroscience, and multi-agent systems. Two complementary approaches can be integrated to this end. The Active Inference framework (AIF) describes how agents employ a generative model to adapt their beliefs about and behaviour within their environment. Game theory formalises strategic interactions between agents with potentially competing objectives. To bridge the gap between the two, we propose a factorisation of the generative model whereby each agent maintains explicit, individual-level beliefs about the internal states of other agents, and uses them for strategic planning in a joint context. We apply our model to iterated general-sum games with two and three players, and study the ensemble effects of game transitions, where the agents' preferences (game payoffs) change over time. This non-stationarity, beyond that caused by reciprocal adaptation, reflects a more naturalistic environment in which agents need to adapt to changing social contexts. Finally, we present a dynamical analysis of key AIF quantities: the variational free energy (VFE) and the expected free energy (EFE) from numerical simulation data. The ensemble-level EFE allows us to characterise the basins of attraction of games with multiple Nash Equilibria under different conditions, and we find that it is not necessarily minimised at the aggregate level. By integrating AIF and game theory, we can gain deeper insights into how intelligent collectives emerge, learn, and optimise their actions in dynamic environments, both cooperative and non-cooperative.

主动推理多智能体博弈论动态环境

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