arXiv:2411.07494cs.CL2024-11被引 15

用少量样本快速防御大模型越狱攻击

Rapid Response: Mitigating LLM Jailbreaks with a Few Examples

  • 通过生成相似越狱样例,快速扩展防御训练数据
  • 仅看一个例子即降低攻击成功率240倍以上
  • 适合需要即时应对新型越狱的系统安全团队

随着大语言模型能力增强,防范滥用变得至关重要。现有防御方法尚未实现对攻击的完全免疫。本文提出一种新思路:不追求完美鲁棒性,而是快速响应,仅基于少量观察到的攻击样本,即能阻断一类越狱攻击。为此,我们构建了RapidResponseBench基准,评估防御方法在适应少数样本后的鲁棒性。实验评估五种快速响应方法,均采用越狱样本扩散技术,自动生成与已观测样本相似的新增越狱实例。最强方法通过微调输入分类器来拦截扩散后的越狱样本,在分布内越狱集上将攻击成功率降低超过240倍,在分布外越狱集上降低超过15倍,且仅需每类策略观察一个样本。进一步研究表明,扩散模型质量与生成样本数量显著影响防御效果。结果表明,快速响应新越狱手段具有显著潜力。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

As large language models (LLMs) grow more powerful, ensuring their safety against misuse becomes crucial. While researchers have focused on developing robust defenses, no method has yet achieved complete invulnerability to attacks. We propose an alternative approach: instead of seeking perfect adversarial robustness, we develop rapid response techniques to look to block whole classes of jailbreaks after observing only a handful of attacks. To study this setting, we develop RapidResponseBench, a benchmark that measures a defense's robustness against various jailbreak strategies after adapting to a few observed examples. We evaluate five rapid response methods, all of which use jailbreak proliferation, where we automatically generate additional jailbreaks similar to the examples observed. Our strongest method, which fine-tunes an input classifier to block proliferated jailbreaks, reduces attack success rate by a factor greater than 240 on an in-distribution set of jailbreaks and a factor greater than 15 on an out-of-distribution set, having observed just one example of each jailbreaking strategy. Moreover, further studies suggest that the quality of proliferation model and number of proliferated examples play an key role in the effectiveness of this defense. Overall, our results highlight the potential of responding rapidly to novel jailbreaks to limit LLM misuse.

大模型安全越狱防御快速响应

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