arXiv:2411.10624cs.LOcs.AI2024-11被引 1
弱许可在道德冲突下无法用经典逻辑语义稳定定义
Weak Permission is not Well-Founded, Grounded and Stable
- 从非单调推理视角分析弱许可的逻辑基础
- 在三种标准语义下均无法处理道德冲突场景
- 适合逻辑与伦理计算领域的研究者阅读
我们考察了弱许可作为无法推出相反义务的结论这一概念。从非单调推理，特别是逻辑编程和结构化论证的角度出发，我们证明在存在道义冲突的情况下，无法在始终如一、根基稳固及（谨慎的）稳定语义下实现弱许可的刻画。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
We consider the notion of weak permission as the failure to conclude that the opposite obligation. We investigate the issue from the point of non-monotonic reasoning, specifically logic programming and structured argumentation, and we show that it is not possible to capture weak permission in the presence of deontic conflicts under the well-founded, grounded and (sceptical) stable semantics.
逻辑推理道义逻辑非单调
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