研究多议题多党竞选中支出策略如何影响选民关注度，发现议会选举有稳定均衡解。
Voter Priming Campaigns: Strategies, Equilibria, and Algorithms
- 构建多议题多党竞选模型，分析支出对选民关注度的引导机制。
- 议会选举中纯策略均衡总存在，且可在线性时间内计算得出。
- 总统选举多数情况下无均衡，适合研究政治策略与博弈行为的学者参考。
议题重要性是选民决策的关键因素。候选人和政党通过竞选活动将关注点引导至自身有利的议题——这一过程称为优先效应（priming）。本文研究多议题、多党环境下竞选支出的动态、策略及均衡。考虑议会选举（目标为最大化得票份额）和多种总统选举情形（赢家通吃）。对于议会选举，证明纯策略均衡始终存在，且可在与选民数量线性相关的时间内计算得出。在两党及所有情形下，存在仅在一个议题上投入的均衡策略，且可在议题数多项式、选民数线性时间内求解。此外，多数总统选举场景中不存在均衡。还探讨了最优竞选策略的其他性质。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Issue salience is a major determinant in voters' decisions. Candidates and political parties campaign to shift salience to their advantage - a process termed priming. We study the dynamics, strategies and equilibria of campaign spending for voter priming in multi-issue multi-party settings. We consider both parliamentary elections, where parties aim to maximize their share of votes, and various settings for presidential elections, where the winner takes all. For parliamentary elections, we show that pure equilibrium spending always exists and can be computed in time linear in the number of voters. For two parties and all settings, a spending equilibrium exists such that each party invests only in a single issue, and an equilibrium can be computed in time that is polynomial in the number of issues and linear in the number of voters. We also show that in most presidential settings no equilibrium exists. Additional properties of optimal campaign strategies are also studied.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品；中文卡片由大模型生成，请以原文为准。