arXiv:2412.19873cs.LG2024-12被引 6

提出最优采样复杂度的多智能体鲁棒强化学习算法

Minimax-Optimal Multi-Agent Robust Reinforcement Learning

  • 基于生成模型扩展Q-FTRL算法至有限时长远距离多智能体鲁棒博弈
  • 采样复杂度逼近理论下界,达$ ilde{O}(H^3S extstyleigsum A_i extstyleigminegin{Bmatrix}H,1/Rackslashend{Bmatrix}/ extstyleigvarepsilon^2)$
  • 适用于对抗性环境下的多智能体系统,尤其适合零和博弈场景

多智能体鲁棒强化学习(即多玩家鲁棒马尔可夫博弈,RMGs)是建模环境不确定性下竞争交互的重要框架,广泛应用于多智能体系统。然而,现有研究在采样复杂度方面存在三重障碍:不确定性范围或精度受限、多智能体带来的维度灾难、长时域导致的挑战,使现有结果远超信息论下界。为此,本文将Q-FTRL算法扩展至有限时长远距离的RMGs设定,并假设拥有生成模型。证明所提算法在(忽略对数因子)$ ilde{O}(H^3S extstyleigsum_{i=1}^mA_i extstyleigminegin{Bmatrix}H,1/Rackslashend{Bmatrix}/ extstyleigvarepsilon^2)$ 的采样复杂度下达到$\varepsilon$-鲁棒粗相关均衡(CCE),且该复杂度为极小极大最优。此外,在双人零和RMGs情形下,算法同样以相同复杂度达成$\varepsilon$-鲁棒纳什均衡。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Multi-agent robust reinforcement learning, also known as multi-player robust Markov games (RMGs), is a crucial framework for modeling competitive interactions under environmental uncertainties, with wide applications in multi-agent systems. However, existing results on sample complexity in RMGs suffer from at least one of three obstacles: restrictive range of uncertainty level or accuracy, the curse of multiple agents, and the barrier of long horizons, all of which cause existing results to significantly exceed the information-theoretic lower bound. To close this gap, we extend the Q-FTRL algorithm \citep{li2022minimax} to the RMGs in finite-horizon setting, assuming access to a generative model. We prove that the proposed algorithm achieves an $\varepsilon$-robust coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) with a sample complexity (up to log factors) of $\widetilde{O}\left(H^3S\sum_{i=1}^mA_i\min\left\{H,1/R\right\}/\varepsilon^2\right)$, where $S$ denotes the number of states, $A_i$ is the number of actions of the $i$-th agent, $H$ is the finite horizon length, and $R$ is uncertainty level. We also show that this sample compelxity is minimax optimal by combining an information-theoretic lower bound. Additionally, in the special case of two-player zero-sum RMGs, the algorithm achieves an $\varepsilon$-robust Nash equilibrium (NE) with the same sample complexity.

多智能体鲁棒强化学习博弈论最优性

Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品;中文卡片由大模型生成,请以原文为准。