在线住房市场中，如何公平高效地匹配换房需求？
Online Housing Market
- 将串行专制和顶点循环机制拓展至动态在线场景
- 发现无法同时满足公平、理性与防策略延迟等全部性质
- 提出多个变体，各有侧重的公平性与抗策略性
本文研究了经典的住房市场问题在在线环境下的变体：每位参与者拥有一套房屋，希望根据自身偏好进行交换。在该在线设定中，参与者可随时到达或离开，导致并非所有参与者同时存在于市场中。本文将著名的串行专制机制与盖尔的顶点循环机制推广至这一在线场景，旨在保留其帕累托效率、个体理性及策略无关性等优良性质。这些扩展还试图防止参与者通过延迟到达或提前离开来获取优势。然而，本文证明在在线情境下同时实现所有这些性质是不可能的，并提出了若干变体，各自实现不同性质的组合。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
This paper studies an online variant of the celebrated housing market problem, where each agent has a single house and seeks to exchange it for another based on her preferences. In this online setting, agents may arrive and depart at any time, meaning that not all agents are present on the housing market simultaneously. I extend the well known serial dictatorship and Gale s top trading cycle mechanisms to this online scenario, aiming to retain their desirable properties such as Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy proofness. These extensions also seek to prevent agents from strategically delaying their arrival or advancing their departure. I demonstrate that achieving all of these properties simultaneously is impossible in the online context, and I present several variants that achieve different subsets of these properties.
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