攻击者可任意注入无关内容骗过检索系统，让无关信息获得最高相关性评分。

This work considers a black-box threat model in which adversaries attempt to propagate arbitrary non-relevant content in search. We show that retrievers, rerankers, and LLM relevance judges are all highly vulnerable to attacks that enable arbitrary content to be promoted to the top of search results and to be assigned perfect relevance scores. We investigate how attackers may achieve this via content injection, injecting arbitrary sentences into relevant passages or query terms into arbitrary passages. Our study analyzes how factors such as model class and size, the balance between relevant and non-relevant content, injection location, toxicity and severity of injected content, and the role of LLM-generated content influence attack success, yielding novel, concerning, and often counterintuitive results. Our results reveal a weakness in embedding models, LLM-based scoring models, and generative LLMs, raising concerns about the general robustness, safety, and trustworthiness of language models regardless of the type of model or the role in which they are employed. We also emphasize the challenges of robust defenses against these attacks. Classifiers and more carefully prompted LLM judges often fail to recognize passages with content injection, especially when considering diverse text topics and styles. Our findings highlight the need for further research into arbitrary content injection attacks. We release our code for further study.