多影响者竞争中，理性策略是极端夸大，而非诚实表达。
The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment
- 构建多方博弈模型，分析影响者如何应对彼此竞争。
- 纯纳什均衡下，多数影响者会最大化夸张程度。
- 揭示信息失真背后的博弈逻辑，对对齐价值有启示。
当多个影响者争夺接收者的注意力时，其策略必须考虑彼此的存在。我们提出战斗影响者博弈（Battling Influencers Game, BIG），一种多玩家同步移动的通用和博弈，以从博弈论角度刻画这一社会现象。我们证明BIG是一个潜在博弈，它要么只有一个，要么有无限多个纯纳什均衡（NE），且这些纯NE可通过凸优化求得。有趣的是，我们还证明在任意纯纳什均衡下，所有影响者（至多一个例外）都必须将其行为夸张到极致。这意味着，影响者理性的非真实与极端行为，是因为他们预见到其他影响者的影响力会部分抵消自身影响。我们讨论了BIG对价值对齐的意义。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
When multiple influencers attempt to compete for a receiver's attention, their influencing strategies must account for the presence of one another. We introduce the Battling Influencers Game (BIG), a multi-player simultaneous-move general-sum game, to provide a game-theoretic characterization of this social phenomenon. We prove that BIG is a potential game, that it has either one or an infinite number of pure Nash equilibria (NEs), and these pure NEs can be found by convex optimization. Interestingly, we also prove that at any pure NE, all (except at most one) influencers must exaggerate their actions to the maximum extent. In other words, it is rational for the influencers to be non-truthful and extreme because they anticipate other influencers to cancel out part of their influence. We discuss the implications of BIG to value alignment.
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