研究带成本约束的液态民主，如何低成本实现全民代表投票
The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control
- 引入预算限制，优化投票与委托的成本
- 确保委托路径短且权力不集中，整体成本最低
- 揭示外部操控选举的计算难易程度，适合安全设计者
我们研究一种基于批准制的液态民主模型，其中对投票和委托设置预算约束，目标是中心化选择出能完整代表全体选民的投票人。从计算复杂性角度出发，重点在于最小化总体成本、保持较短的委托路径，并防止投票权过度集中。此外，还探讨了策略性控制的计算特性，具体分析外部实体是否可通过改变选举要素来影响特定选民的投票权。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete representation of the electorate. From a computational complexity perspective, we focus on minimizing overall costs, maintaining short delegation paths, and preventing excessive concentration of voting power. Furthermore, we explore computational aspects of strategic control, specifically, whether external agents can change election components to influence the voting power of certain voters.
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