arXiv:2502.05547cs.CRcs.AI2025-02NeurIPS被引 29

提出DDFed框架,同时保护隐私并抵御模型投毒攻击。

Dual Defense: Enhancing Privacy and Mitigating Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning

  • 用全同态加密实现安全聚合,不依赖复杂假设
  • 两阶段异常检测机制可识别加密更新中的恶意行为
  • 无需新增参与方,适合真实联邦学习场景

联邦学习(FL)天然易受隐私泄露和模型投毒攻击。现有研究分别采用安全聚合保护隐私、鲁棒聚合抵御攻击,但两者难以兼顾:安全聚合遮蔽了原始模型更新,使大多数异常检测方法失效。已有联合方案多依赖非共谋双服务器或三方计算,破坏了原有拓扑且难扩展。为此,本文提出双防护联邦学习(DDFed)框架,可在不引入新角色或改变拓扑的前提下,同时增强隐私保护与抗投毒能力。首先利用先进的全同态加密(FHE)实现安全聚合,保障强隐私;其次提出一种针对加密更新的两阶段异常检测机制,包含安全相似性计算与反馈驱动的协同筛选,并在检测中集成防御拜占庭客户端的隐私泄露风险。在多种模型投毒攻击及跨设备、跨域场景下的实验表明,DDFed能有效保护隐私并抵御投毒威胁。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Federated learning (FL) is inherently susceptible to privacy breaches and poisoning attacks. To tackle these challenges, researchers have separately devised secure aggregation mechanisms to protect data privacy and robust aggregation methods that withstand poisoning attacks. However, simultaneously addressing both concerns is challenging; secure aggregation facilitates poisoning attacks as most anomaly detection techniques require access to unencrypted local model updates, which are obscured by secure aggregation. Few recent efforts to simultaneously tackle both challenges offen depend on impractical assumption of non-colluding two-server setups that disrupt FL's topology, or three-party computation which introduces scalability issues, complicating deployment and application. To overcome this dilemma, this paper introduce a Dual Defense Federated learning (DDFed) framework. DDFed simultaneously boosts privacy protection and mitigates poisoning attacks, without introducing new participant roles or disrupting the existing FL topology. DDFed initially leverages cutting-edge fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to securely aggregate model updates, without the impractical requirement for non-colluding two-server setups and ensures strong privacy protection. Additionally, we proposes a unique two-phase anomaly detection mechanism for encrypted model updates, featuring secure similarity computation and feedback-driven collaborative selection, with additional measures to prevent potential privacy breaches from Byzantine clients incorporated into the detection process. We conducted extensive experiments on various model poisoning attacks and FL scenarios, including both cross-device and cross-silo FL. Experiments on publicly available datasets demonstrate that DDFed successfully protects model privacy and effectively defends against model poisoning threats.

联邦学习隐私保护投毒攻击同态加密

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