用双层投票机制减少群体偏见，高效达成无社会影响的共识

We introduce Social Bayesian Optimization (SBO), a vote-efficient algorithm for consensus-building in collective decision-making. In contrast to single-agent scenarios, collective decision-making encompasses group dynamics that may distort agents' preference feedback, thereby impeding their capacity to achieve a social-influence-free consensus -- the most preferable decision based on the aggregated agent utilities. We demonstrate that under mild rationality axioms, reaching social-influence-free consensus using noisy feedback alone is impossible. To address this, SBO employs a dual voting system: cheap but noisy public votes (e.g., show of hands in a meeting), and more accurate, though expensive, private votes (e.g., one-to-one interview). We model social influence using an unknown social graph and leverage the dual voting system to efficiently learn this graph. Our theoretical findigns show that social graph estimation converges faster than the black-box estimation of agents' utilities, allowing us to reduce reliance on costly private votes early in the process. This enables efficient consensus-building primarily through noisy public votes, which are debiased based on the estimated social graph to infer social-influence-free feedback. We validate the efficacy of SBO across multiple real-world applications, including thermal comfort, team building, travel negotiation, and energy trading collaboration.