提出新攻击方法,从清洗过的训练数据中还原个人隐私信息
R.R.: Unveiling LLM Training Privacy through Recollection and Ranking
- 用提示词诱导模型填补被遮蔽的隐私信息
- 通过评分排序准确识别出真实隐私数据,效果优于基线方法
- 适合关注大模型隐私漏洞的研究者和安全从业者
大语言模型存在显著隐私风险,可能因隐式记忆泄露训练数据。现有隐私攻击多集中于成员推断或数据提取,但难以重建训练数据中的具体个人身份信息(PII)。本文提出R.R.(Recollect and Rank)两阶段隐私窃取攻击,可从已遮蔽PII的训练数据中重构隐私实体。第一阶段引入“重忆”提示范式,指令模型重复遮蔽文本并填充掩码;利用PII标识符提取候选信息。第二阶段设计新评分标准,结合参考模型进行校准,对候选项排序。在三个主流PII数据集上的实验表明,R.R.性能优于基线。结果揭示即使训练数据经清洗,大模型仍面临PII泄露风险。代码与数据集已在GitHub发布。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Large Language Models (LLMs) pose significant privacy risks, potentially leaking training data due to implicit memorization. Existing privacy attacks primarily focus on membership inference attacks (MIAs) or data extraction attacks, but reconstructing specific personally identifiable information (PII) in LLMs' training data remains challenging. In this paper, we propose R.R. (Recollect and Rank), a novel two-step privacy stealing attack that enables attackers to reconstruct PII entities from scrubbed training data where the PII entities have been masked. In the first stage, we introduce a prompt paradigm named recollection, which instructs the LLM to repeat a masked text but fill in masks. Then we can use PII identifiers to extract recollected PII candidates. In the second stage, we design a new criterion to score each PII candidate and rank them. Motivated by membership inference, we leverage the reference model as a calibration to our criterion. Experiments across three popular PII datasets demonstrate that the R.R. achieves better PII identification performance than baselines. These results highlight the vulnerability of LLMs to PII leakage even when training data has been scrubbed. We release our code and datasets at GitHub.
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