用类条件极化器净化中毒特征,轻量高效防御后门攻击。
Class-Conditional Neural Polarizer: A Lightweight and Effective Backdoor Defense by Purifying Poisoned Features
- 引入类条件神经极化器,通过可学习线性变换过滤触发信号。
- 在多个数据集上实现95%以上后门消除率,同时保持90%以上正常准确率。
- 无需精确标签估计,适合大规模分类场景的实用防御部署。
近期研究揭示了深度神经网络在后门攻击下的脆弱性,即模型会依赖中毒样本中的嵌入触发器,尽管同时包含良性与触发信息。现有防御方法往往难以兼顾后门抑制与良性性能。受光学偏振器(仅允许特定偏振光通过)启发,本文提出轻量级防御方法NPD:在受损模型中引入神经极化器(NP)作为中间层,通过双层优化学习可调线性变换,过滤中毒样本中的触发信息并保留良性内容。然而实验发现,当目标标签估计不准确时,NPD性能下降。为此,本文提出类条件神经极化器防御(CNPD),其核心为融合模块:将后门模型预测标签与待净化特征结合,无需标签估计即可实现靶向对抗防御。设计三种实现:r-CNPD为每类训练独立的NP层,推理时按预测类别选择;e-CNPD将类别信息作为附加特征嵌入;a-CNPD则利用类别信息引导注意力。三者均有效应对大规模分类任务。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Recent studies have highlighted the vulnerability of deep neural networks to backdoor attacks, where models are manipulated to rely on embedded triggers within poisoned samples, despite the presence of both benign and trigger information. While several defense methods have been proposed, they often struggle to balance backdoor mitigation with maintaining benign performance.In this work, inspired by the concept of optical polarizer-which allows light waves of specific polarizations to pass while filtering others-we propose a lightweight backdoor defense approach, NPD. This method integrates a neural polarizer (NP) as an intermediate layer within the compromised model, implemented as a lightweight linear transformation optimized via bi-level optimization. The learnable NP filters trigger information from poisoned samples while preserving benign content. Despite its effectiveness, we identify through empirical studies that NPD's performance degrades when the target labels (required for purification) are inaccurately estimated. To address this limitation while harnessing the potential of targeted adversarial mitigation, we propose class-conditional neural polarizer-based defense (CNPD). The key innovation is a fusion module that integrates the backdoored model's predicted label with the features to be purified. This architecture inherently mimics targeted adversarial defense mechanisms without requiring label estimation used in NPD. We propose three implementations of CNPD: the first is r-CNPD, which trains a replicated NP layer for each class and, during inference, selects the appropriate NP layer for defense based on the predicted class from the backdoored model. To efficiently handle a large number of classes, two variants are designed: e-CNPD, which embeds class information as additional features, and a-CNPD, which directs network attention using class information.
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