用指称行为和注意力机制解释感知指代如何与世界对接
Deictic Codes, Demonstratives, and Reference: A Step Toward Solving the Grounding Problem
- 通过空间和物体中心注意力建立指称与世界的因果关联
- 指称固定发生在概念前的底层认知层面，避免循环论证
- 呼应普特南和克里普克的指称理论，为具身认知提供机制
本文探讨体验性概念的指称问题。鉴于感知指代是此类概念的基本形式，我们研究如何确定其指称对象。为避免‘编码主义’——即仅在表征之间建立关联——我们主张指称固定必须是自下而上的非概念过程，从而打破概念内容的循环，真正触及世界。为此，需要表征与世界之间的适当因果关系。我们认为，这种关系由空间和物体中心注意力所驱动，通过指称行为形成对象文件。整个因果过程发生于前概念层面，满足解决指称难题的要求。最后，我们指出该理论捕捉了普特南与克里普克关于‘新指称’的核心洞见。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
In this paper we address the issue of grounding for experiential concepts. Given that perceptual demonstratives are a basic form of such concepts, we examine ways of fixing the referents of such demonstratives. To avoid 'encodingism', that is, relating representations to representations, we postulate that the process of reference fixing must be bottom-up and nonconceptual, so that it can break the circle of conceptual content and touch the world. For that purpose, an appropriate causal relation between representations and the world is needed. We claim that this relation is provided by spatial and object-centered attention that leads to the formation of object files through the function of deictic acts. This entire causal process takes place at a pre-conceptual level, meeting the requirement for a solution to the grounding problem. Finally we claim that our account captures fundamental insights in Putnam's and Kripke's work on "new" reference.
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