2-bit量化模型仍易受攻击,提出QADT-R提升抗补丁攻击能力
Breaking the Limits of Quantization-Aware Defenses: QADT-R for Robustness Against Patch-Based Adversarial Attacks in QNNs
- 在量化模型中生成对抗补丁,增强多比特位鲁棒性
- 训练时动态切换比特位,降低过拟合风险
- 适合边缘设备部署的高鲁棒性量化模型设计
量化神经网络(QNNs)因其压缩模型体积和降低计算开销,成为边缘部署的理想选择。尽管量化能抑制像素级对抗攻击,但对补丁类攻击的有效性尚未明确。本文发现,即使在2比特极端量化下,对抗补丁仍保持超70%攻击成功率(ASR),挑战了量化固有防御的假设。为此提出QADT-R:结合自适应量化感知补丁生成(A-QAPA)、动态比特位训练(DBWT)与梯度不一致正则化(GIR),实现跨比特位鲁棒性。在CIFAR-10和ImageNet上的实验表明,相比PBAT和DWQ等现有方法,QADT-R可将ASR降低最高25%。进一步分析揭示,PBAT训练模型虽对已见补丁有效,却因量化偏移无法泛化至未知补丁。梯度对齐、空间敏感性和补丁可见性分析揭示了补丁高迁移性的机制。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Quantized Neural Networks (QNNs) have emerged as a promising solution for reducing model size and computational costs, making them well-suited for deployment in edge and resource-constrained environments. While quantization is known to disrupt gradient propagation and enhance robustness against pixel-level adversarial attacks, its effectiveness against patch-based adversarial attacks remains largely unexplored. In this work, we demonstrate that adversarial patches remain highly transferable across quantized models, achieving over 70\% attack success rates (ASR) even at extreme bit-width reductions (e.g., 2-bit). This challenges the common assumption that quantization inherently mitigates adversarial threats. To address this, we propose Quantization-Aware Defense Training with Randomization (QADT-R), a novel defense strategy that integrates Adaptive Quantization-Aware Patch Generation (A-QAPA), Dynamic Bit-Width Training (DBWT), and Gradient-Inconsistent Regularization (GIR) to enhance resilience against highly transferable patch-based attacks. A-QAPA generates adversarial patches within quantized models, ensuring robustness across different bit-widths. DBWT introduces bit-width cycling during training to prevent overfitting to a specific quantization setting, while GIR injects controlled gradient perturbations to disrupt adversarial optimization. Extensive evaluations on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet show that QADT-R reduces ASR by up to 25\% compared to prior defenses such as PBAT and DWQ. Our findings further reveal that PBAT-trained models, while effective against seen patch configurations, fail to generalize to unseen patches due to quantization shift. Additionally, our empirical analysis of gradient alignment, spatial sensitivity, and patch visibility provides insights into the mechanisms that contribute to the high transferability of patch-based attacks in QNNs.
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