视觉感知中存在不依赖概念的封装内容，是经验得以成立的必要条件。
There must be encapsulated nonconceptual content in vision
- 通过感知的奠基问题，论证视觉模块实现从感觉到对象识别的跃迁。
- 若视觉经验真实存在，则必有信息封闭的非概念内容作为前提。
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本文旨在支持杰里·福多（Fodor 1983）的论点：输入系统具有模块性，因而具备信息封闭性。论证始于感知中的‘奠基问题’——即如何解释感知能够产生视觉体验，使感官刺激转化为对主体有意义的感知。既然视觉经验实际存在，可据此展开先验论证，揭示其可能的条件。本文提出，其中一个条件是存在福多意义上的视觉模块，该模块使感知能从感觉跃升至对象识别，从而实现视觉经验。由此推断，视觉感知中必然存在信息封闭的非概念内容。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
In this paper I want to propose an argument to support Jerry Fodor's thesis (Fodor 1983) that input systems are modular and thus informationally encapsulated. The argument starts with the suggestion that there is a "grounding problem" in perception, i. e. that there is a problem in explaining how perception that can yield a visual experience is possible, how sensation can become meaningful perception of something for the subject. Given that visual experience is actually possible, this invites a transcendental argument that explains the conditions of its possibility. I propose that one of these conditions is the existence of a visual module in Fodor's sense that allows the step from sensation to object-identifying perception, thus enabling visual experience. It seems to follow that there is informationally encapsulated nonconceptual content in visual perception.
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