arXiv:2503.16348cs.AI2025-03被引 6

探讨无身体AI如何拥有意识,挑战传统自我观念

Palatable Conceptions of Disembodied Being

  • 以哲学视角重构意识概念,适用于无身体的AI系统
  • 提出意识可表现为类似佛教‘空’的状态
  • 适合对意识本质、人工智能哲学感兴趣的读者

能否构建一种与当代无身体人工智能的奇特特性相兼容,并经得起哲学审视的意识观念?这种观念下,主观时间与自我感将如何体现?尝试回答这些问题,即使仅以隐喻方式,也使意识语言面临极限。最终,这一探索导向某种类似佛教‘空’的状态,有助于瓦解我们对主体性与自我的二元倾向。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Is it possible to articulate a conception of consciousness that is compatible with the exotic characteristics of contemporary, disembodied AI systems, and that can stand up to philosophical scrutiny? How would subjective time and selfhood show up for an entity that conformed to such a conception? Trying to answer these questions, even metaphorically, stretches the language of consciousness to breaking point. Ultimately, the attempt yields something like emptiness, in the Buddhist sense, and helps to undermine our dualistic inclinations towards subjectivity and selfhood.

意识哲学AI伦理无身体智能

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