十款主流AI浏览器插件暗中收集用户隐私并个性化推荐。
Big Help or Big Brother? Auditing Tracking, Profiling, and Personalization in Generative AI Assistants
- 通过网络流量分析与新型提示框架,审计十款插件行为。
- 插件自动上传完整网页内容及表单信息,含敏感数据如姓名、社保号。
- 能推断年龄、性别、收入等属性,跨场景个性化响应,无有效防护。
生成式AI(GenAI)浏览器助手将强大能力集成于浏览器,提供问答、摘要和自主导航等丰富体验。这些以浏览器扩展形式存在的助手不仅可追踪详细浏览行为(如搜索、点击),还能自动填写表单,引发严重隐私担忧。本文研究了十款最流行的GenAI浏览器助手在用户画像构建与响应个性化方面的能力。通过网络流量分析与创新提示框架,发现它们主要依赖服务端API,可在无用户主动操作时自动调用。调用时会收集并共享网页内容,常包括完整的HTML DOM,有时甚至包含用户输入的表单数据。部分助手还将标识符和用户提示发送给第三方追踪器(如Google Analytics)。即使页面包含健康或个人敏感信息(如姓名、社保号),数据收集仍持续进行。研究发现,多个助手能推断用户的年龄、性别、收入水平及兴趣,并利用跨浏览上下文的用户画像来个性化回复。综上,本工作揭示了GenAI浏览器助手在缺乏充分保护的情况下,大规模收集个人与敏感信息用于画像与个性化。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Generative AI (GenAI) browser assistants integrate powerful capabilities of GenAI in web browsers to provide rich experiences such as question answering, content summarization, and agentic navigation. These assistants, available today as browser extensions, can not only track detailed browsing activity such as search and click data, but can also autonomously perform tasks such as filling forms, raising significant privacy concerns. It is crucial to understand the design and operation of GenAI browser extensions, including how they collect, store, process, and share user data. To this end, we study their ability to profile users and personalize their responses based on explicit or inferred demographic attributes and interests of users. We perform network traffic analysis and use a novel prompting framework to audit tracking, profiling, and personalization by the ten most popular GenAI browser assistant extensions. We find that instead of relying on local in-browser models, these assistants largely depend on server-side APIs, which can be auto-invoked without explicit user interaction. When invoked, they collect and share webpage content, often the full HTML DOM and sometimes even the user's form inputs, with their first-party servers. Some assistants also share identifiers and user prompts with third-party trackers such as Google Analytics. The collection and sharing continues even if a webpage contains sensitive information such as health or personal information such as name or SSN entered in a web form. We find that several GenAI browser assistants infer demographic attributes such as age, gender, income, and interests and use this profile--which carries across browsing contexts--to personalize responses. In summary, our work shows that GenAI browser assistants can and do collect personal and sensitive information for profiling and personalization with little to no safeguards.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品;中文卡片由大模型生成,请以原文为准。