利用无线信道特性触发后门攻击，隐蔽性强且无需修改输入数据。
A Channel-Triggered Backdoor Attack on Wireless Semantic Image Reconstruction
- 以信道增益或噪声功率等统计特征作为触发信号，实现隐蔽攻击。
- 在四种JSCC架构上测试，攻击成功率接近100%且不被察觉。
- 适合研究无线语义通信安全的学者，尤其关注隐秘攻击与防御者。
本文研究面向图像的语义通信系统中的后门攻击问题。现有针对语义通信符号重构的后门攻击多依赖输入级触发器，在输入受限场景下不实用。本文提出一种新型信道触发后门攻击（CT-BA）框架，利用无线信道固有特性作为激活触发信号。核心创新在于使用不同衰落分布下的信道增益或不同功率的信道噪声作为潜在触发因子。该方法通过避免显式输入修改提升隐蔽性，通过从多样信道条件中选择触发器增强灵活性，并借助自然信道变化自动激活，无需攻击者干预。我们在四种联合源信道编码（JSCC）系统架构和三个基准数据集上广泛评估了CT-BA。仿真结果表明，该攻击在保持高效隐蔽性的前提下，实现了接近完美的攻击成功率（ASR）。最后，讨论了潜在的防御机制。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
This paper investigates backdoor attacks in image-oriented semantic communications. The threat of backdoor attacks on symbol reconstruction in semantic communication (SemCom) systems has received limited attention. Previous research on backdoor attacks targeting SemCom symbol reconstruction primarily focuses on input-level triggers, which are impractical in scenarios with strict input constraints. In this paper, we propose a novel channel-triggered backdoor attack (CT-BA) framework that exploits inherent wireless channel characteristics as activation triggers. Our key innovation involves utilizing fundamental channel statistics parameters, specifically channel gain with different fading distributions or channel noise with different power, as potential triggers. This approach enhances stealth by eliminating explicit input manipulation, provides flexibility through trigger selection from diverse channel conditions, and enables automatic activation via natural channel variations without adversary intervention. We extensively evaluate CT-BA across four joint source-channel coding (JSCC) communication system architectures and three benchmark datasets. Simulation results demonstrate that our attack achieves near-perfect attack success rate (ASR) while maintaining effective stealth. Finally, we discuss potential defense mechanisms against such attacks.
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