系统是否提供补救建议，会影响公平性与整体效率
To Give or Not to Give? The Impacts of Strategically Withheld Recourse
- 理性系统为防被滥用，常选择不给补救方案
- 不给补救导致群体整体收益下降，弱势群体更受损
- 补贴补救可提升系统提供意愿，减少不公平
个体常试图通过补救措施（如修改申请条件）逆转自动化系统的不利决定（如贷款拒批）。虽然提供补救能提升用户收益和系统效用，但也暴露决策机制，可能被个体集体利用进行策略性操纵。我们发现，这种矛盾导致理性、追求自身效用最大化的系统往往选择不提供补救，从而降低整体人口效用，尤其影响敏感群体。为缓解此问题，我们探索了补救补贴的作用，发现其能有效激励系统提供更多补救建议，降低潜在社会成本，并缓解因补救缺失引发的不公平。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Individuals often aim to reverse undesired outcomes in interactions with automated systems, like loan denials, by either implementing system-recommended actions (recourse), or manipulating their features. While providing recourse benefits users and enhances system utility, it also provides information about the decision process that can be used for more effective strategic manipulation, especially when the individuals collectively share such information with each other. We show that this tension leads rational utility-maximizing systems to frequently withhold recourse, resulting in decreased population utility, particularly impacting sensitive groups. To mitigate these effects, we explore the role of recourse subsidies, finding them effective in increasing the provision of recourse actions by rational systems, as well as lowering the potential social cost and mitigating unfairness caused by recourse withholding.
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