探讨AI是否具备道德主体性，指出当前AI缺乏真实自主性
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Relationship between Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Patiency
- 区分基本、自主与道德代理，分析AI在三者中的缺失
- 当前AI受预设目标约束，无法真正自主塑造行为
- 未来非意识AI或可实现有限道德代理，挑战传统认知
人工智能系统展现出复杂且看似具代理性的行为，亟需哲学层面对其代理性、自主性与道德地位进行审视。本文系统分析了人工系统中基本代理、自主代理与道德代理的区别。我们论证当前AI虽高度复杂，却缺乏真正的代理性和自主性：其行为受限于预设目标，无法在环境中真正目标导向地行动；无法真实塑造与世界的互动；缺乏自我反思与自主能力，不足以构成完全自主。然而，我们不排除未来通过混合伦理决策方法，非意识的AI可能实现有限形式的人工道德代理。这引出一个观点：若意识并非道德承受力的必要条件，则此类非意识的AMAs可能挑战传统上道德代理与道德承受力之间的必然联系。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
The proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems exhibiting complex and seemingly agentive behaviours necessitates a critical philosophical examination of their agency, autonomy, and moral status. In this paper we undertake a systematic analysis of the differences between basic, autonomous, and moral agency in artificial systems. We argue that while current AI systems are highly sophisticated, they lack genuine agency and autonomy because: they operate within rigid boundaries of pre-programmed objectives rather than exhibiting true goal-directed behaviour within their environment; they cannot authentically shape their engagement with the world; and they lack the critical self-reflection and autonomy competencies required for full autonomy. Nonetheless, we do not rule out the possibility of future systems that could achieve a limited form of artificial moral agency without consciousness through hybrid approaches to ethical decision-making. This leads us to suggest, by appealing to the necessity of consciousness for moral patiency, that such non-conscious AMAs might represent a case that challenges traditional assumptions about the necessary connection between moral agency and moral patiency.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品；中文卡片由大模型生成，请以原文为准。