用肉眼看不见的红外墨水设计攻击贴片,让近红外人脸识别失效。
Human-Imperceptible Physical Adversarial Attack for NIR Face Recognition Models
- 用可忽略的红外吸收墨水生成优化形状和位置的攻击贴片。
- 物理域平均攻击成功率82.46%,高于现有方法的64.18%。
- 适用于真实场景,对不同人脸姿态仍有效,适合安全评估者参考。
近红外(NIR)人脸识别系统在低光或化妆条件下表现良好,但易受物理对抗攻击。为揭示真实应用中的潜在风险,我们设计了一种新型、隐蔽且实用的对抗贴片,在黑盒设置下攻击NIR人脸识别系统。通过使用人眼不可见的红外吸收墨水,生成经数字优化形状与位置的多个贴片,并建立人体皮肤的光照反射模型,以模拟NIR光反射,减少数字与真实成像间的差异。实验表明,相比现有最先进(SOTA)的NIR人脸识别物理攻击方法,本方法在数字与物理域均提升攻击成功率,尤其在不同人脸姿态下保持有效性。所提方法在物理域平均攻击成功率达到82.46%,显著优于现有方法的64.18%。相关代码与材料已公开于https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Human-imperceptible-adversarial-patch-0703/。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Near-infrared (NIR) face recognition systems, which can operate effectively in low-light conditions or in the presence of makeup, exhibit vulnerabilities when subjected to physical adversarial attacks. To further demonstrate the potential risks in real-world applications, we design a novel, stealthy, and practical adversarial patch to attack NIR face recognition systems in a black-box setting. We achieved this by utilizing human-imperceptible infrared-absorbing ink to generate multiple patches with digitally optimized shapes and positions for infrared images. To address the optimization mismatch between digital and real-world NIR imaging, we develop a light reflection model for human skin to minimize pixel-level discrepancies by simulating NIR light reflection. Compared to state-of-the-art (SOTA) physical attacks on NIR face recognition systems, the experimental results show that our method improves the attack success rate in both digital and physical domains, particularly maintaining effectiveness across various face postures. Notably, the proposed approach outperforms SOTA methods, achieving an average attack success rate of 82.46% in the physical domain across different models, compared to 64.18% for existing methods. The artifact is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Human-imperceptible-adversarial-patch-0703/.
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