提出两种不改变残差的隐蔽攻击，可绕过ADMM系统检测
Residual-Evasive Attacks on ADMM in Distributed Optimization
- 用随机初值加正交化保持残差不变，实现隐身
- 攻击使电压逼近上限，可诱发电力系统失稳
- 适合研究电力系统安全与对抗性优化的学者
本文提出两种攻击策略，旨在通过在攻击迭代中避免显著改变残差，从而逃避基于残差的检测机制。许多检测算法依赖于识别残差异常变化来发现虚假数据注入，而本工作证明，所提攻击能维持残差基本不变，因而难以被察觉。第一种策略采用随机初始点结合Gram-Schmidt正交化，确保攻击的隐蔽性，并可通过增强正交分量进一步加剧系统扰动。第二种策略在此基础上改进，以获取经济收益为目标，通过操纵无功功率，将系统推向电压上限，利用运行约束实现破坏。在IEEE 14节点系统上的案例研究表明，所提出的攻击-鲁棒机制有效验证了其可行性。与常见简单攻击相比，两种策略在实现复杂度、可检测性和攻击效果之间存在权衡，揭示了ADMM系统在面对高级攻击时的脆弱性。这些结果强调需发展更鲁棒的监控算法以应对新型威胁。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
This paper presents two attack strategies designed to evade detection in ADMM-based systems by preventing significant changes to the residual during the attacked iteration. While many detection algorithms focus on identifying false data injection through residual changes, we show that our attacks remain undetected by keeping the residual largely unchanged. The first strategy uses a random starting point combined with Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization to ensure stealth, with potential for refinement by enhancing the orthogonal component to increase system disruption. The second strategy builds on the first, targeting financial gains by manipulating reactive power and pushing the system to its upper voltage limit, exploiting operational constraints. The effectiveness of the proposed attack-resilient mechanism is demonstrated through case studies on the IEEE 14-bus system. A comparison of the two strategies, along with commonly used naive attacks, reveals trade-offs between simplicity, detectability, and effectiveness, providing insights into ADMM system vulnerabilities. These findings underscore the need for more robust monitoring algorithms to protect against advanced attack strategies.
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