提出新型音频越狱攻击，可绕过语音模型安全防护。

Jailbreak attacks to Large audio-language models (LALMs) are studied recently, but they exclusively focused on the attack scenario where the adversary can fully manipulate user prompts (named strong adversary) and limited in effectiveness, applicability, and practicability. In this work, we first conduct an extensive evaluation showing that advanced text jailbreak attacks cannot be easily ported to end-to-end LALMs via text-to-speech (TTS) techniques. We then propose AUDIOJAILBREAK, a novel audio jailbreak attack, featuring (1) asynchrony: the jailbreak audios do not need to align with user prompts in the time axis by crafting suffixal jailbreak audios; (2) universality: a single jailbreak perturbation is effective for different prompts by incorporating multiple prompts into the perturbation generation; (3) stealthiness: the malicious intent of jailbreak audios is concealed by proposing various intent concealment strategies; and (4) over-the-air robustness: the jailbreak audios remain effective when being played over the air by incorporating reverberation into the perturbation generation. In contrast, all prior audio jailbreak attacks cannot offer asynchrony, universality, stealthiness, and/or over-the-air robustness. Moreover, AUDIOJAILBREAK is also applicable to a more practical and broader attack scenario where the adversary cannot fully manipulate user prompts (named weak adversary). Extensive experiments with thus far the most LALMs demonstrate the high effectiveness of AUDIOJAILBREAK, in particular, it can jailbreak openAI's GPT-4o-Audio and bypass Meta's Llama-Guard-3 safeguard, in the weak adversary scenario. We highlight that our work peeks into the security implications of audio jailbreak attacks against LALMs, and realistically fosters improving their robustness, especially for the newly proposed weak adversary.