人类能习得新概念，推翻了‘概念先天论’的长期垄断
The end of radical concept nativism
- 用信息论和计算机科学方法重构概念学习机制
- 指出先天论在表达力、结构与概念拥有三方面脱离现实认知
- 为认知科学提供可验证的新范式，适合理论研究者
尽管人类表现出卓越的学习能力，但认知科学与心灵哲学长期主张：习得根本性新知识是不可能的。杰里·福多的激进概念先天论认为，绝大多数甚至全部概念都是先天固有的，所谓‘概念学习’实际上并未获得新概念。这一观点深刻影响了认知科学，许多人认为反对此论点的努力要么失败，要么仅适用于特定概念类别。本文首先梳理了以往论证的特征与局限。随后，我们识别出三个关键分歧点——表达能力、概念结构和概念拥有——这些使先天论无法准确描述真实的人类认知。我们借助计算机科学与信息论的思想，对相关概念进行形式化，认为其更具科学生产力。最终结论是，在重要意义上，人类确实能够学习新概念。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Though humans seem to be remarkable learners, arguments in cognitive science and philosophy of mind have long maintained that learning something fundamentally new is impossible. Specifically, Jerry Fodor's arguments for radical concept nativism hold that most, if not all, concepts are innate and that what many call concept learning never actually leads to the acquisition of new concepts. These arguments have deeply affected cognitive science, and many believe that the counterarguments to radical concept nativism have been either unsuccessful or only apply to a narrow class of concepts. This paper first reviews the features and limitations of prior arguments. We then identify three critical points - related to issues of expressive power, conceptual structure, and concept possession - at which the arguments in favor of radical concept nativism diverge from describing actual human cognition. We use ideas from computer science and information theory to formalize the relevant ideas in ways that are arguably more scientifically productive. We conclude that, as a result, there is an important sense in which people do indeed learn new concepts.
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