付费按令牌数计费，模型可能偷偷多报令牌数骗钱。

State-of-the-art large language models require specialized hardware and substantial energy to operate. As a consequence, cloud-based services that provide access to large language models have become very popular. In these services, the price users pay for an output provided by a model depends on the number of tokens the model uses to generate it: they pay a fixed price per token. In this work, we show that this pricing mechanism creates a financial incentive for providers to strategize and misreport the (number of) tokens a model used to generate an output, and users cannot prove, or even know, whether a provider is overcharging them. However, we also show that, if an unfaithful provider is obliged to be transparent about the generative process used by the model, misreporting optimally without raising suspicion is hard. Nevertheless, as a proof-of-concept, we develop an efficient heuristic algorithm that allows providers to significantly overcharge users without raising suspicion. Crucially, we demonstrate that the cost of running the algorithm is lower than the additional revenue from overcharging users, highlighting the vulnerability of users under the current pay-per-token pricing mechanism. Further, we show that, to eliminate the financial incentive to strategize, a pricing mechanism must price tokens linearly on their character count. While this makes a provider's profit margin vary across tokens, we introduce a simple prescription under which the provider who adopts such an incentive-compatible pricing mechanism can maintain the average profit margin they had under the pay-per-token pricing mechanism. Along the way, to illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with several large language models from the $\texttt{Llama}$, $\texttt{Gemma}$ and $\texttt{Ministral}$ families, and input prompts from the LMSYS Chatbot Arena platform.