用后门标记测试集,精准检测大模型是否偷用过基准数据。
DyePack: Provably Flagging Test Set Contamination in LLMs Using Backdoors
- 在测试集中混入带随机目标的多个后门样本
- 多选题任务中误报率低至0.000017%,全检出污染模型
- 无需模型内部信息,适合评估模型训练透明性
开放基准对评估和推进大语言模型至关重要,但其公开性使其易受测试集污染。本文提出DyePack框架,利用后门攻击识别在基准测试集上训练过的模型,无需访问模型损失、输出或内部结构。如同银行用染料包标记劫匪,DyePack将后门样本混入测试数据以标记被污染的模型。通过设计多重带随机目标的后门,实现精确的假阳性率(FPR)计算,可保证不误判,同时为每例污染提供强证据。在三个数据集上的五种模型测试中,针对多选题任务,使用八个后门在MMLU-Pro和Big-Bench-Hard上分别实现0.000073%和0.000017%的最低假阳性率,并完全检出所有污染模型;针对开放式生成任务,在Alpaca上使用六个后门,以0.127%的假阳性率准确识别所有污染模型。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Open benchmarks are essential for evaluating and advancing large language models, offering reproducibility and transparency. However, their accessibility makes them likely targets of test set contamination. In this work, we introduce DyePack, a framework that leverages backdoor attacks to identify models that used benchmark test sets during training, without requiring access to the loss, logits, or any internal details of the model. Like how banks mix dye packs with their money to mark robbers, DyePack mixes backdoor samples with the test data to flag models that trained on it. We propose a principled design incorporating multiple backdoors with stochastic targets, enabling exact false positive rate (FPR) computation when flagging every model. This provably prevents false accusations while providing strong evidence for every detected case of contamination. We evaluate DyePack on five models across three datasets, covering both multiple-choice and open-ended generation tasks. For multiple-choice questions, it successfully detects all contaminated models with guaranteed FPRs as low as 0.000073% on MMLU-Pro and 0.000017% on Big-Bench-Hard using eight backdoors. For open-ended generation tasks, it generalizes well and identifies all contaminated models on Alpaca with a guaranteed false positive rate of just 0.127% using six backdoors.
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