用强化学习干扰视觉注意力,防住图文模型的隐蔽后门攻击
SRD: Reinforcement-Learned Semantic Perturbation for Backdoor Defense in VLMs
- 通过强化学习自动识别并扰动图像敏感区域
- 对局部和全局后门攻击有效,误报率降至3.6%~5.6%
- 无需了解触发模式,保持生成内容语义连贯性
视觉语言模型在图像描述任务中取得显著进展,但近期研究发现其易受后门攻击。攻击者可在推理阶段注入难以察觉的扰动,触发异常行为并生成恶意描述。此类攻击因触发信号隐蔽且跨模态传播而难以检测与防御。本文分析现有攻击模式,发现两个关键漏洞:(1)模型对输入图像特定区域出现异常注意力集中;(2)后门攻击常引发语义偏移与句子不连贯。基于此,提出语义奖励防御(SRD),一种无需先验触发知识的强化学习框架。SRD通过深度Q网络策略对图像输入的敏感上下文区域施加离散扰动,以混淆注意力并阻断恶意路径激活。设计语义保真度得分作为奖励信号,联合评估生成描述的语义一致性与语言流畅性,引导策略优化。SRD实现了无触发依赖、策略可解释的防御范式,有效缓解局部(TrojVLM)与全局(Shadowcast)后门攻击,分别将攻击成功率(ASR)降至3.6%和5.6%,对干净输入的平均CIDEr下降不足15%。代码见https://github.com/Ciconey/SRD.git。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Visual language models (VLMs) have made significant progress in image captioning tasks, yet recent studies have found they are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Attackers can inject undetectable perturbations into the data during inference, triggering abnormal behavior and generating malicious captions. These attacks are particularly challenging to detect and defend against due to the stealthiness and cross-modal propagation of the trigger signals. In this paper, we identify two key vulnerabilities by analyzing existing attack patterns: (1) the model exhibits abnormal attention concentration on certain regions of the input image, and (2) backdoor attacks often induce semantic drift and sentence incoherence. Based on these insights, we propose Semantic Reward Defense (SRD), a reinforcement learning framework that mitigates backdoor behavior without requiring any prior knowledge of trigger patterns. SRD learns to apply discrete perturbations to sensitive contextual regions of image inputs via a deep Q-network policy, aiming to confuse attention and disrupt the activation of malicious paths. To guide policy optimization, we design a reward signal named semantic fidelity score, which jointly assesses the semantic consistency and linguistic fluency of the generated captions, encouraging the agent to achieve a robust yet faithful output. SRD offers a trigger-agnostic, policy-interpretable defense paradigm that effectively mitigates local (TrojVLM) and global (Shadowcast) backdoor attacks, reducing ASR to 3.6% and 5.6% respectively, with less than 15% average CIDEr drop on the clean inputs. Our codes can be found at https://github.com/Ciconey/SRD.git.
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