研究多人决策中责任分散问题，发现唯一避免方式是选举一人独断。
Diffusion of Responsibility in Collective Decision Making
- 通过构建决策机制的双仿真模型，分析责任分配
- 两人决策时必须一人独裁才能避免责任模糊
- 多于两人时需选举独裁者，适合制度设计参考
“责任扩散”指多个参与者共同承担结果时，个体责任被弱化。本文研究集体决策中的这一现象：若由两人决策，则唯有其中一人独断才能避免责任扩散；当参与者超过两人时，任何无责任扩散的机制都必须是“选举独裁制”，即成员选举一人做出单方面决定。技术上，作者定义了决策机制的双仿真关系，证明其保持责任相关性质，并在最小等价机制上得出结论。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
The term "diffusion of responsibility'' refers to situations in which multiple agents share responsibility for an outcome, obscuring individual accountability. This paper examines this frequently undesirable phenomenon in the context of collective decision-making mechanisms. The work shows that if a decision is made by two agents, then the only way to avoid diffusion of responsibility is for one agent to act as a "dictator'', making the decision unilaterally. In scenarios with more than two agents, any diffusion-free mechanism is an "elected dictatorship'' where the agents elect a single agent to make a unilateral decision. The technical results are obtained by defining a bisimulation of decision-making mechanisms, proving that bisimulation preserves responsibility-related properties, and establishing the results for a smallest bisimular mechanism.
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