让无人机在欺骗攻击下仍能稳定飞行，通过渐进式训练提升抗干扰能力。

Autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) increasingly rely on reinforcement learning (RL) for navigation. However, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing attacks can induce out-of-distribution observation shifts that corrupt value estimation and degrade mission performance. Existing robust RL approaches typically improve resilience against specific attack models but often fail to generalize to attacks not encountered during training. To address this limitation, we propose a curriculum-guided adaptation framework that progressively exposes a robust policy to gradient-based adversarial observation perturbations of increasing intensity while aligning temporal-difference (TD) error distributions across curriculum stages. Rather than adapting to a particular attack model, the proposed approach preserves TD-error consistency to promote transferability across attack conditions. We further derive a TD-space generalization certificate showing that if the TD-error distribution induced by a test-time attack remains sufficiently close to that of the final curriculum stage, the resulting performance degradation is bounded. The framework is evaluated in a UAV deconfliction environment with dynamic 3D obstacles under previously unseen fixed and dynamic GNSS spoofing attacks. Under fixed spoofing conditions, the curriculum-adapted policy achieved near-perfect mission success rates, compared with 20-56% for standard and robust RL baselines. Under dynamic obstacle-luring spoofing attacks, it achieved the highest episodic rewards while reducing mission completion steps by up to 45% across increasing aerial traffic densities.