提出针对联邦学习的隐私泄露攻击与防御方法
Find a Scapegoat: Poisoning Membership Inference Attack and Defense to Federated Learning
- 恶意客户端通过伪造模型更新发起成员推理攻击
- 在多个数据集上验证攻击有效,可成功推断用户是否参与训练
- 提出鲁棒防御机制,显著降低攻击影响,适合隐私敏感场景
联邦学习(FL)允许多个客户端在不共享原始数据的情况下协同训练全局模型,契合如GDPR等隐私法规,被众多企业采用。然而其分布式特性使其易受投毒攻击:恶意客户端发送有害数据以破坏模型。现有攻击多聚焦于降低模型准确率,较少关注隐私风险。本文提出新型投毒成员推理攻击FedPoisonMIA,恶意客户端通过精心设计本地模型更新来推断成员信息。同时,我们设计了一种鲁棒防御机制以缓解该攻击。大量实验在多个数据集上验证了攻击的有效性,而所提防御方法能显著降低攻击影响。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Federated learning (FL) allows multiple clients to collaboratively train a global machine learning model with coordination from a central server, without needing to share their raw data. This approach is particularly appealing in the era of privacy regulations like the GDPR, leading many prominent companies to adopt it. However, FL's distributed nature makes it susceptible to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients, controlled by an attacker, send harmful data to compromise the model. Most existing poisoning attacks in FL aim to degrade the model's integrity, such as reducing its accuracy, with limited attention to privacy concerns from these attacks. In this study, we introduce FedPoisonMIA, a novel poisoning membership inference attack targeting FL. FedPoisonMIA involves malicious clients crafting local model updates to infer membership information. Additionally, we propose a robust defense mechanism to mitigate the impact of FedPoisonMIA attacks. Extensive experiments across various datasets demonstrate the attack's effectiveness, while our defense approach reduces its impact to a degree.
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