用CLIP模型分离中毒数据,高效清除各类后门攻击
CLIP-Guided Backdoor Defense through Entropy-Based Poisoned Dataset Separation
- 利用CLIP模型判断样本是否中毒,指导重训练
- 在4个数据集上将攻击成功率压至1%以下,准确率下降仅0.3%
- 对弱版或被攻陷的CLIP仍有效,适合实际部署
深度神经网络易受后门攻击,攻击者通过污染训练数据植入后门。现有防御方法普遍存在计算成本高或对先进攻击(如无标签、无图像后门)效果差的问题。本文提出一种名为CGD的高效防御方法,利用公开的CLIP模型识别可能干净或中毒的输入,并以CLIP的输出作为引导进行模型重训练,从而有效消除后门。在4个数据集和11种攻击类型上的实验表明,CGD可将攻击成功率(ASR)降至1%以下,同时保持干净准确率(CA)下降不超过0.3%,显著优于现有方法。此外,本方法可将基于干净数据的防御迁移至中毒数据场景。即使使用较弱的CLIP模型或其本身被植入后门,CGD仍能维持低攻击成功率,展现出卓越的效率、有效性与实用性。代码已开源。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison training data to implant backdoor into the victim model. Current backdoor defenses on poisoned data often suffer from high computational costs or low effectiveness against advanced attacks like clean-label and clean-image backdoors. To address them, we introduce CLIP-Guided backdoor Defense (CGD), an efficient and effective method that mitigates various backdoor attacks. CGD utilizes a publicly accessible CLIP model to identify inputs that are likely to be clean or poisoned. It then retrains the model with these inputs, using CLIP's logits as a guidance to effectively neutralize the backdoor. Experiments on 4 datasets and 11 attack types demonstrate that CGD reduces attack success rates (ASRs) to below 1% while maintaining clean accuracy (CA) with a maximum drop of only 0.3%, outperforming existing defenses. Additionally, we show that clean-data-based defenses can be adapted to poisoned data using CGD. Also, CGD exhibits strong robustness, maintaining low ASRs even when employing a weaker CLIP model or when CLIP itself is compromised by a backdoor. These findings underscore CGD's exceptional efficiency, effectiveness, and applicability for real-world backdoor defense scenarios. Code: https://github.com/binyxu/CGD.
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