提出社交网络拍卖中两种新机制，确保竞标者诚实报价并积极拉人
Strategyproofness and Monotone Allocation of Auction in Social Networks
- 定义两类单调分配规则：拉人抑制与拉人促进型
- 证明存在可计算的最优收益支付机制
- 解决单需求竞标者组合拍卖的策略抗性难题
社交网络拍卖中的策略抗性要求竞标者不仅如实申报估值，还需尽力邀请社交网络中的邻居参与。与经典拍卖中基于Myerson引理的价值单调分配为基石不同，当前尚无通用的策略抗性网络拍卖分配原则。我们发现，由于缺乏此类原则，即使扩展到单单位需求的多单位拍卖也面临意外困难，所有早期研究均无法实现策略抗性。首次在该领域识别出两类网络单调分配规则：邀请抑制单调性（ID-MON）与邀请促进单调性（IP-MON），它们涵盖了现有网络拍卖的所有分配规则作为特例。对于任意给定的ID-MON或IP-MON规则，我们刻画了策略抗性支付规则的存在性及充分条件，并证明在所有此类规则中，存在可计算的收入最大化支付规则。由此，单需求竞标者组合网络拍卖的障碍得以解决。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone allocation in Myerson's Lemma is a cornerstone, a general principle of allocation rules for strategyproof network auctions is still missing. We show that, due to the absence of such a principle, even extensions to multi-unit network auctions with single-unit demand present unexpected difficulties, and all pioneering researches fail to be strategyproof. For the first time in this field, we identify two categories of monotone allocation rules on networks: Invitation-Depressed Monotonicity (ID-MON) and Invitation-Promoted Monotonicity (IP-MON). They encompass all existing allocation rules of network auctions as specific instances. For any given ID-MON or IP-MON allocation rule, we characterize the existence and sufficient conditions for the strategyproof payment rules, and show that among all such payment rules, the revenue-maximizing one exists and is computationally feasible. With these results, the obstacle of combinatorial network auction with single-minded bidders is now resolved.
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