发现编码基私有信息检索方案的安全漏洞，挑战其后量子安全性。
On the Security of a Code-Based PIR Scheme
- 揭示编码基PIR方案的致命弱点，导致安全等级大幅下降。
- 对比表明该方案通信开销不具优势，竞争力减弱。
- 呼吁继续研究编码基PIR，作为格基方案的潜在替代路径。
私有信息检索（PIR）允许客户端在不暴露所请求文件身份的情况下从数据库中获取数据。为实现后量子安全，当前多数PIR方案基于硬格问题。相比之下，称为CB-cPIR的方案是首个尝试将PIR建立在编码理论难题上的开创性工作，显著拓展了安全基础。然而，我们的研究发现，该方案存在关键漏洞，严重削弱其安全性。进一步与当前最先进的PIR方案对比显示，CB-cPIR在通信开销上已无明显优势，竞争力下降。尽管如此，这些发现也凸显了继续探索编码基PIR的重要性，因其可能为格基方法提供有价值的替代方案。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes allow clients to retrieve files from a database without disclosing the requested file's identity to the server. In the pursuit of post-quantum security, most recent PIR schemes rely on hard lattice problems. In contrast, the so called CB-cPIR scheme stands out as a pioneering effort to base PIR schemes on hard problems in coding theory, thereby contributing significantly to the diversification of security foundations. However, our research reveals a critical vulnerability in CB-cPIR, substantially diminishing its security levels. Moreover, a comparative analysis with state-of-the-art PIR schemes shows that CB-cPIR's advantages are reduced, making it less competitive in terms of the communication cost. Nevertheless, our findings highlight the importance of continued research into code-based PIR schemes, as they have the potential to provide a valuable alternative to lattice-based approaches.
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