利用上下文关系提升语义分割后门攻击成功率
ConSeg: Contextual Backdoor Attack Against Semantic Segmentation
- 通过模仿目标类别的上下文信息重建受害区域,建立类间关联
- 攻击成功率提升15.55%,且可绕过现有防御机制
- 适合研究模型安全与对抗性攻击的人员参考
尽管计算机视觉取得显著进展,语义分割模型仍可能遭受后门攻击。此类攻击通过隐藏触发器,使模型在触发器存在时将目标类别误分类为攻击者指定的类别,严重威胁模型可靠性。本文提出一种简单而有效的后门攻击方法——上下文分割后门攻击(ConSeg),其核心思想是:当目标类别被设定为受害类别的共现类别时,更容易实现误分割。ConSeg利用语义分割模型固有的上下文信息,模仿目标类别的上下文特征,并将其重构到受害区域,从而建立目标类别与受害类别之间的上下文关联,增强攻击效果。实验表明,ConSeg相比现有方法攻击成功率提升15.55%,且对当前最先进的后门防御手段具有较强鲁棒性。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Despite significant advancements in computer vision, semantic segmentation models may be susceptible to backdoor attacks. These attacks, involving hidden triggers, aim to cause the models to misclassify instances of the victim class as the target class when triggers are present, posing serious threats to the reliability of these models. To further explore the field of backdoor attacks against semantic segmentation, in this paper, we propose a simple yet effective backdoor attack called Contextual Segmentation Backdoor Attack (ConSeg). ConSeg leverages the contextual information inherent in semantic segmentation models to enhance backdoor performance. Our method is motivated by an intriguing observation, i.e., when the target class is set as the `co-occurring' class of the victim class, the victim class can be more easily `mis-segmented'. Building upon this insight, ConSeg mimics the contextual information of the target class and rebuilds it in the victim region to establish the contextual relationship between the target class and the victim class, making the attack easier. Our experiments reveal that ConSeg achieves improvements in Attack Success Rate (ASR) with increases of 15.55\%, compared to existing methods, while exhibiting resilience against state-of-the-art backdoor defenses.
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