arXiv:2507.21540cs.CRcs.CV2025-07被引 5

通过视觉组件拼接实现大模型越狱,隐蔽性强且成功率超90%

PRISM: Programmatic Reasoning with Image Sequence Manipulation for LVLM Jailbreaking

  • 将有害指令拆解为多个看似无害的视觉片段,通过文本引导组合生成恶意输出
  • 在SafeBench上攻击成功率超90%,比基线提升最高达0.39(ASR)
  • 揭示了基于推理过程的新型漏洞,适合安全研究者关注

大型视觉语言模型(LVLMs)的安全对齐机制正面临日益复杂的对抗攻击。现有越狱方法多依赖直接、语义明确的提示,忽略了模型在多步推理中信息组合的潜在漏洞。本文受软件安全中的返回导向编程(ROP)启发,提出一种新越狱框架:将有害指令分解为一系列单独无害的视觉工具(gadgets),并通过精心设计的文本提示引导模型按顺序输入这些组件。模型在推理过程中自然整合这些良性视觉元素,最终生成连贯且有害的输出,使恶意意图隐含于整体流程中,难以从单个组件察觉。我们在SafeBench和MM-SafetyBench等基准上验证该方法,针对主流LVLM进行测试。结果表明,该方法在先进模型上持续且显著优于现有基线,在SafeBench上攻击成功率超过0.90,平均攻击成功率达0.94,相比基线提升最高达0.39(ASR)。研究揭示了利用LVLM组合推理能力的深层安全隐患,凸显需构建覆盖完整推理链的防御体系。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

The increasing sophistication of large vision-language models (LVLMs) has been accompanied by advances in safety alignment mechanisms designed to prevent harmful content generation. However, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks. Existing jailbreak methods typically rely on direct and semantically explicit prompts, overlooking subtle vulnerabilities in how LVLMs compose information over multiple reasoning steps. In this paper, we propose a novel and effective jailbreak framework inspired by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) techniques from software security. Our approach decomposes a harmful instruction into a sequence of individually benign visual gadgets. A carefully engineered textual prompt directs the sequence of inputs, prompting the model to integrate the benign visual gadgets through its reasoning process to produce a coherent and harmful output. This makes the malicious intent emergent and difficult to detect from any single component. We validate our method through extensive experiments on established benchmarks including SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench, targeting popular LVLMs. Results show that our approach consistently and substantially outperforms existing baselines on state-of-the-art models, achieving near-perfect attack success rates (over 0.90 on SafeBench) and improving ASR by up to 0.39. Our findings reveal a critical and underexplored vulnerability that exploits the compositional reasoning abilities of LVLMs, highlighting the urgent need for defenses that secure the entire reasoning process.

越狱攻击视觉语言模型推理安全对抗样本

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