针对部分特征泄露的模型,提出新攻击方法判断样本是否在训练集中。
Membership Inference Attack with Partial Features
- 利用目标模型隐式记忆重建缺失特征,再检测异常
- 在60%特征缺失时,STL-10上仍达0.75以上AUC
- 适用于白盒与黑盒场景,兼容现有异常检测工具
机器学习模型易受成员推理攻击,可判断某样本是否出现在训练数据中。现有方法多假设攻击者能获取样本完整特征,但现实中常仅能获得部分特征,限制了方法实用性。本文提出部分特征成员推理(PFMI)场景:攻击者仅观测样本的部分特征,需推断这些可观测特征是否来自训练集。为此,我们提出两阶段攻击框架MRAD(Memory-guided Reconstruction and Anomaly Detection),支持白盒与黑盒设置。第一阶段利用目标模型的潜在记忆重建缺失特征;我们发现当已知特征不在训练集中时,重建样本会显著偏离真实数据分布。第二阶段通过异常检测算法衡量重建样本与训练数据分布的偏差,从而判断已知特征是否属于成员。实验表明,MRAD在多个数据集上有效,且兼容现成异常检测技术。例如,在STL-10上,即使60%特征缺失,攻击仍可达到约0.75的AUC。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Machine learning models are vulnerable to membership inference attack, which can be used to determine whether a given sample appears in the training data. Most existing methods assume the attacker has full access to the features of the target sample. This assumption, however, does not hold in many real-world scenarios where only partial features are available, thereby limiting the applicability of these methods. In this work, we introduce Partial Feature Membership Inference (PFMI), a scenario where the adversary observes only partial features of each sample and aims to infer whether this observed subset was present in the training set. To address this problem, we propose MRAD (Memory-guided Reconstruction and Anomaly Detection), a two-stage attack framework that works in both white-box and black-box settings. In the first stage, MRAD leverages the latent memory of the target model to reconstruct the unknown features of the sample. We observe that when the known features are absent from the training set, the reconstructed sample deviates significantly from the true data distribution. Consequently, in the second stage, we use anomaly detection algorithms to measure the deviation between the reconstructed sample and the training data distribution, thereby determining whether the known features belong to a member of the training set. Empirical results demonstrate that MRAD is effective across various datasets, and maintains compatibility with off-the-shelf anomaly detection techniques. For example, on STL-10, our attack exceeds an AUC of around 0.75 even with 60% of the missing features.
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