提出首个针对多模态联邦提示学习的后门攻击，隐蔽性强且成功率超90%

Prompt-based tuning has emerged as a lightweight alternative to full fine-tuning in large vision-language models, enabling efficient adaptation via learned contextual prompts. This paradigm has recently been extended to federated learning settings (e.g., PromptFL), where clients collaboratively train prompts under data privacy constraints. However, the security implications of prompt-based aggregation in federated multimodal learning remain largely unexplored, leaving a critical attack surface unaddressed. In this paper, we introduce \textbf{BadPromptFL}, the first backdoor attack targeting prompt-based federated learning in multimodal contrastive models. In BadPromptFL, compromised clients jointly optimize local backdoor triggers and prompt embeddings, injecting poisoned prompts into the global aggregation process. These prompts are then propagated to benign clients, enabling universal backdoor activation at inference without modifying model parameters. Leveraging the contextual learning behavior of CLIP-style architectures, BadPromptFL achieves high attack success rates (e.g., \(>90\%\)) with minimal visibility and limited client participation. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets and aggregation protocols validate the effectiveness, stealth, and generalizability of our attack, raising critical concerns about the robustness of prompt-based federated learning in real-world deployments.