arXiv:2508.09181cs.LGcs.AI2025-08被引 10

针对车联网非独立同分布数据,提出长期客户端选择拍卖机制提升模型性能。

Long-Term Client Selection for Federated Learning with Non-IID Data: A Truthful Auction Approach

  • 基于长期数据质量与能耗评估,设计带押金的诚实拍卖机制。
  • 实验表明该方法显著缓解非独立同分布数据导致的性能下降。
  • 适合资源受限的车联网场景,保障客户端参与真实性。

联邦学习(FL)为智能网联汽车等移动节点提供了去中心化协作训练框架,各车辆作为移动客户端参与模型训练而不上传本地数据。由于驾驶模式和环境差异,不同车辆的数据呈非独立同分布(non-IID),严重影响模型收敛与准确率。传统客户端选择方法依赖每轮独立评估数据质量,需等待所有客户端完成本地训练后才决策,导致资源浪费。在车联网中,车辆计算与连接资源有限,信息不对称易引发客户端虚假申报,削弱选择效果。为此,本文提出基于诚实拍卖的长期客户端选择联邦学习(LCSFLA)方案,综合考虑长期数据质量与能源成本,通过引入押金机制的推荐拍卖,激励客户端真实参与并确保信息可信。理论证明了机制的激励相容性与个体理性。多数据集(包括车联网场景)实验验证其能有效缓解非独立同分布数据带来的性能下降。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Federated learning (FL) provides a decentralized framework that enables universal model training through collaborative efforts on mobile nodes, such as smart vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). Each smart vehicle acts as a mobile client, contributing to the process without uploading local data. This method leverages non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID) training data from different vehicles, influenced by various driving patterns and environmental conditions, which can significantly impact model convergence and accuracy. Although client selection can be a feasible solution for non-IID issues, it faces challenges related to selection metrics. Traditional metrics evaluate client data quality independently per round and require client selection after all clients complete local training, leading to resource wastage from unused training results. In the IoV context, where vehicles have limited connectivity and computational resources, information asymmetry in client selection risks clients submitting false information, potentially making the selection ineffective. To tackle these challenges, we propose a novel Long-term Client-Selection Federated Learning based on Truthful Auction (LCSFLA). This scheme maximizes social welfare with consideration of long-term data quality using a new assessment mechanism and energy costs, and the advised auction mechanism with a deposit requirement incentivizes client participation and ensures information truthfulness. We theoretically prove the incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advised incentive mechanism. Experimental results on various datasets, including those from IoV scenarios, demonstrate its effectiveness in mitigating performance degradation caused by non-IID data.

联邦学习车联网非IID拍卖机制

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