用马尔可夫博弈建模多主体碳封存管理，兼顾安全约束与多方利益。

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects typically involve a diverse array of stakeholders or players from public, private, and regulatory sectors, each with different objectives and responsibilities. Given the complexity, scale, and long-term nature of CCS operations, determining whether individual stakeholders can independently maximize their interests or whether collaborative coalition agreements are needed remains a central question for effective CCS project planning and management. CCS projects are often implemented in geologically connected sites, where shared geological features such as pressure space and reservoir pore capacity can lead to competitive behavior among stakeholders. Furthermore, CO2 storage sites are often located in geologically mature basins that previously served as sites for hydrocarbon extraction or wastewater disposal in order to leverage existing infrastructures, which makes unilateral optimization even more complicated and unrealistic. In this work, we propose a paradigm based on Markov games to quantitatively investigate how different coalition structures affect the goals of stakeholders. We frame this multi-stakeholder multi-site problem as a multi-agent reinforcement learning problem with safety constraints. Our approach enables agents to learn optimal strategies while compliant with safety regulations. We present an example where multiple operators are injecting CO2 into their respective project areas in a geologically connected basin. To address the high computational cost of repeated simulations of high-fidelity models, a previously developed surrogate model based on the Embed-to-Control (E2C) framework is employed. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in addressing optimal management of CO2 storage when multiple stakeholders with various objectives and goals are involved.