为智能体网络构建零信任安全架构，防范逻辑层攻击。
Fortifying the Agentic Web: A Unified Zero-Trust Architecture Against Logic-layer Threats
- 用去中心化身份和可验证凭证构建可信智能体身份体系。
- 通过动态行为认证与因果链审计，实现攻击可追踪、可防御。
- 适合研究智能体安全或构建可信AI系统的开发者参考。
本文提出一种统一的安全架构，通过零信任身份与访问管理（IAM）框架强化智能体网络。该架构基于丰富的可验证智能体身份，采用去中心化标识符（DIDs）和可验证凭证（VCs），并通过协议无关的智能体名称服务（ANS）实现身份发现。安全机制由多层次的信任基础设施支撑，引入创新技术包括信任自适应运行环境（TARE）、因果链审计及基于行为证明的动态身份。通过在形式化安全模型中明确关联LPCI威胁与对应防护措施，本工作提供了一个全面且前瞻性的安全蓝图，确保智能体生态系统的可信、弹性与安全。形式化分析表明，该架构对LPCI攻击具备可证明的安全性保障，成功概率被限制在可控范围内。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
This paper presents a Unified Security Architecture that fortifies the Agentic Web through a Zero-Trust IAM framework. This architecture is built on a foundation of rich, verifiable agent identities using Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs), with discovery managed by a protocol-agnostic Agent Name Service (ANS). Security is operationalized through a multi-layered Trust Fabric which introduces significant innovations, including Trust-Adaptive Runtime Environments (TARE), Causal Chain Auditing, and Dynamic Identity with Behavioral Attestation. By explicitly linking the LPCI threat to these enhanced architectural countermeasures within a formal security model, we propose a comprehensive and forward-looking blueprint for a secure, resilient, and trustworthy agentic ecosystem. Our formal analysis demonstrates that the proposed architecture provides provable security guarantees against LPCI attacks with bounded probability of success.
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